Egypt’s Potential Acquisition of Chinese J-10C and J-35 Fighters

Egypt’s Aerial Gambit: The Potential Acquisition of Chinese J-10C and J-35 Fighters

Reports indicating Egypt’s Potential Acquisition of Chinese J-10C and J-35 Fighters represent a potentially seismic shift in Cairo’s long-standing military procurement strategy. If confirmed, such a deal would not only significantly modernize the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) but also carry profound geopolitical implications, reshaping regional power balances and impacting Egypt’s intricate relationships with its traditional Western and Eastern arms suppliers.

The Emerging Picture: What We Know

Recent reports, particularly from Israeli media and defense news outlets, suggest that Egypt is seriously considering or has even initiated moves to acquire these advanced Chinese aircraft. Key indicators include:

• Israeli Concerns: Israeli websites have expressed significant concern over Egypt’s potential acquisition of Chinese fifth-generation stealth fighters, highlighting the advanced radar systems they would bring. This indicates a perceived credible threat to Israel’s regional air superiority, historically maintained with American support.
• Shifting Focus to China: Several sources explicitly state that Egypt has been increasingly turning to China to meet its arms demands, seeking to balance military power in the region.
• J-10C Acquisition: There are unconfirmed reports that Egypt is contracting to acquire up to 40 Chinese J-10C fighter jets, intended to replace aging F-16s in the EAF inventory. Some sources even mention that Egypt received its first batch of J-10CE jets in February 2025, though this remains to be officially confirmed by either government.
• J-35 Interest: Lieutenant General Mahmoud Fuad Abdel Gawad, a senior commander within the Egyptian Air Force, reportedly conveyed strong interest in the fifth-generation J-35A stealth platform during the “Eagle of Civilization” joint air drills held between China and Egypt in April-May 2025. This indicates a desire for advanced stealth capabilities.
• Joint Exercises: The “Eagles of Civilization 2025” joint air force drills, which involved Chinese J-10C fighters and Egyptian MiG-29M/M2s, underscore a deepening military cooperation and interoperability between the two nations. This exercise, the first of its kind in air superiority and suppression of air defenses, is a clear precursor to potential arms sales.

Why the Shift? Egypt’s Diversification Strategy

Egypt has historically maintained a diverse military inventory, drawing heavily from the United States, France, and Russia. However, several factors appear to be driving its pivot towards China:

1. Diversification of Arms Suppliers: Cairo has long pursued a strategy of diversifying its arms sources to avoid over-reliance on any single nation. This enhances its strategic autonomy and provides leverage in negotiations.
2. Frustration with Western Restrictions:
   • U.S. Conditions: Egypt has expressed frustration with U.S. restrictions on arms sales, particularly regarding advanced technologies and certain munitions (e.g., AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles for its F-16 fleet). These restrictions are often linked to human rights concerns or efforts to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) in the region. The inability to fully equip its F-16s with modern BVR missiles has reportedly made them less potent than even some of its Russian MiG-29M2s, which carry R-77 missiles.
   • Perceived “Bullying”: Some Egyptian perspectives suggest that American and French arms dealers have “bullied” Egypt, imposing high prices and limitations despite Cairo being a major customer.
3. Cost-Effectiveness and Technology Transfer: Chinese defense products are often more competitively priced than their Western counterparts. Crucially, China is generally more amenable to technology transfer and local manufacturing arrangements, which appeals to countries like Egypt looking to build indigenous defense capabilities. Egypt has already locally manufactured Chinese Wing Loong drones with Chinese technical support.
4. Meeting Specific Capability Gaps:
   • Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Missiles: The J-10C is equipped with the formidable PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile, capable of engaging targets up to 300 kilometers away. This provides a BVR capability that Egypt’s current F-16s lack due to U.S. restrictions, and would significantly enhance its ability to intercept aerial threats before they reach its airspace.
   • Fifth-Generation Stealth: The J-35 would provide Egypt with its first operational stealth fighter, a critical capability for penetrating advanced air defenses and maintaining air superiority in a future conflict. This directly counters Israel’s F-35 fleet.
5. Geopolitical Alignment: As the international order shifts, Egypt is keen to hedge its bets and deepen ties with rising powers like China, particularly as tensions with the U.S. periodically arise (e.g., over Gaza, human rights, or regional water issues with Ethiopia). Joint military exercises signal a strengthening of strategic partnerships beyond mere commercial transactions.

The Chinese Offerings: Capabilities and Export Strategy

1. Chengdu J-10C (Export variant: J-10CE)

The J-10C is a 4.5-generation multirole fighter, often compared to the American F-16 or French Rafale. It represents a significant upgrade over Egypt’s current F-16s and even some of its MiG-29s.

• Advanced Avionics: Features an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, a glass cockpit, helmet-mounted display (HMD), and integrated mission architecture. The AESA radar provides superior target detection, tracking, and electronic warfare capabilities.
• Stealth Features: While not a true stealth fighter, the J-10C incorporates some reduced radar cross-section (RCS) elements, making it harder to detect than older 4th-gen jets.
• Propulsion: Powered by a single WS-10B turbofan engine, capable of Mach 2.0.
• Armament: Its primary draw for Egypt is the ability to carry and effectively employ the PL-15 BVR air-to-air missile (range >200 km). It also carries short-range PL-10 IR-guided missiles and a range of air-to-surface and anti-ship munitions. It has 11 hardpoints.
• Combat Radius: Reportedly 1,100–1,500 km.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Each J-10CE unit is estimated to cost around US$40-50 million, making it a highly competitive option.
• Export Strategy: China is aggressively promoting the J-10C. Pakistan is currently its only confirmed foreign operator, and China has leveraged unverified claims from Pakistan regarding the J-10CE’s combat success in a skirmish with India (where Pakistan claimed to have downed Indian Rafales) to attract buyers.

2. Shenyang J-35 (Export variant: FC-31, J-35A)

The J-35, initially known as FC-31 Gyrfalcon, is China’s second indigenous fifth-generation stealth fighter, designed primarily for carrier operations and export markets. If Egypt acquires it, it would be a groundbreaking move, as China would be exporting a stealth fighter to a non-allied nation.

• Fifth-Generation Stealth: Features advanced stealth shaping, internal weapons bays (to maintain low observability), and radar-absorbent materials (RAM) to significantly reduce its radar signature. Its estimated RCS is comparable to or slightly larger than the F-35’s.
• Advanced Avionics: Expected to feature a sophisticated AESA radar, Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) targeting systems, a Distributed Aperture System (DAS) for 360-degree situational awareness, and advanced sensor fusion.
• Propulsion: Powered by two Guizhou WS-21 (or upgraded WS-19) turbofan engines, with a projected top speed of Mach 2.0 and potential for supercruise with the WS-19.
• Armament: Internal weapons bay capable of carrying 6 PL-15 BVR AAMs or comparable ordnance. It also has external hardpoints for additional payload when stealth is not critical.
• Multi-role Capability: Designed for air dominance, precision strike, and networked battlefield coordination.
• Export Potential: The J-35A was officially unveiled at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2024, signaling its readiness for the export market. Pakistan is also reportedly eyeing the J-35.

Egypt’s Potential Acquisition of Chinese J-10C and J-35 Fighters on Geopolitical and Military Conditions

The potential acquisition of these Chinese fighters by Egypt would send ripples across several strategic fronts:

1. Impact on Regional Power Balance (Middle East):
   • Egypt-Israel Dynamic: This is the most immediate and sensitive implication. Israel currently enjoys a significant qualitative military edge (QME) in the region, largely due to its advanced U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-35 stealth fighter. If Egypt acquires the J-35, it would introduce a stealth capability into the EAF that directly challenges Israel’s aerial supremacy. The PL-15 missile’s long range on the J-10C further narrows the gap in BVR combat. This could trigger an arms race or heighten regional tensions.
   • Broader Middle East: Other regional powers like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar, which primarily operate Western aircraft, might view this as a shift in military alignments or a test of China’s growing influence.
2. Impact on U.S.-Egypt Relations:
   • Strategic Partnership Strain: The U.S. has been a primary military aid provider to Egypt for decades. A major Chinese arms deal, especially involving fifth-generation technology, would be seen by Washington as a direct challenge to its influence and a diversification away from its security umbrella.
   • Sanctions Risk (CAATSA): The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) could potentially be invoked by the U.S. against Egypt if it proceeds with significant arms purchases from U.S. adversaries like China or Russia. This has happened with Turkey over its S-400 purchase. However, the U.S. might be hesitant to fully alienate a key regional partner like Egypt, especially given its role in regional stability and the Gaza conflict.
   • Future Aid and Sales: Such a deal could jeopardize future U.S. military aid packages or the sale of sensitive U.S. technologies to Egypt.
3. Impact on China’s Global Arms Industry:
   • Breakthrough Market: Securing Egypt as a customer for advanced fighters, particularly the J-35, would be a massive win for China’s arms export industry. It would signify a breakthrough into a major non-allied market that has historically relied on Western and Russian suppliers.
   • Credibility Boost: It would enhance the global credibility and reputation of Chinese military aviation technology, encouraging other nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America to consider Chinese alternatives.
   • Strategic Influence: Arms sales are a key component of China’s “soft power” and strategic influence. By becoming a primary supplier, China deepens its political and economic ties with recipient nations, potentially gaining access or leverage.
4. Impact on Egyptian Air Force Capabilities:
   • Modernization Leap: The J-10C and J-35 would dramatically modernize the EAF, providing capabilities in stealth, BVR combat, and networked operations that it currently lacks.
   • Training and Logistics: Integrating entirely new platforms from a non-traditional supplier would pose significant challenges in terms of pilot training, maintenance, logistics, and spare parts. This would require substantial investment and a long-term commitment from both sides.
   • Interoperability: Integrating these new aircraft with existing Western (F-16s, Rafales, Mirage 2000s) and Russian (MiG-29s) platforms would be complex, requiring sophisticated data link solutions and potentially custom modifications.
5. Russia’s Role:
   • Egypt has also diversified its purchases with Russia, including MiG-29M/M2 fighters and Ka-52 attack helicopters. While Russia remains a significant supplier, its ability to provide cutting-edge aircraft might be impacted by the ongoing war in Ukraine and Western sanctions.
   • China’s willingness to export its most advanced fighters could present a more attractive and reliable option for Egypt than Russia in the long term for high-end platforms.

The Impact of Egypt’s Potential Acquisition of Chinese J-10C and J-35 Fighters on Israel

The potential acquisition of Chinese J-10C and J-35 fighters by Egypt is being viewed with considerable concern in Israel, and for good reason. It directly challenges Israel’s long-held qualitative military edge (QME) in the region, particularly in the aerial domain. Here’s a breakdown of the key implications:

1. Challenging Air Superiority: Israel has historically maintained a significant advantage in air combat capabilities, largely due to its advanced U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-35I Adir stealth fighter. The introduction of the J-35 into the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) would represent a direct challenge to this dominance.
   • Stealth Capability: The J-35 is a fifth-generation stealth fighter, designed to penetrate advanced air defenses and achieve air superiority. Its presence in the EAF would provide Egypt with a capability to operate in contested airspace that it currently lacks. This forces Israel to account for a near-peer stealth adversary in its operational planning and air defense strategies.
   • Reduced Warning Time: Stealth aircraft are designed to minimize radar detection ranges. The J-35’s presence would reduce Israel’s warning time in the event of a conflict, potentially giving Egypt an advantage in striking first or maneuvering undetected.
2. Long-Range Engagement Threat: The J-10C, while not a stealth fighter, is equipped with the formidable PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile. This missile, with a reported range exceeding 200 km, would significantly enhance Egypt’s ability to engage Israeli aircraft at beyond visual range (BVR).
   • Undermining Israeli BVR Advantage: Currently, Israel relies on its advanced air-to-air missiles, including the AIM-120 AMRAAM, to maintain an edge in BVR combat. The PL-15 would provide Egypt with a comparable, if not superior, long-range engagement capability, potentially negating Israel’s technological advantage in this critical area.
   • Forcing Defensive Measures: The PL-15’s range would force Israeli aircraft to operate at greater distances from Egyptian airspace or to invest in more sophisticated electronic warfare and defensive systems to counter the missile’s threat.
3. Potential for Regional Arms Race: Egypt’s acquisition of advanced Chinese fighters could trigger a regional arms race, with Israel and other neighboring states seeking to acquire even more advanced weaponry to maintain or restore their relative military advantage.
   • Increased Defense Spending: This could lead to increased defense spending across the region, diverting resources from other areas of economic and social development.
   • Escalated Tensions: An arms race could also exacerbate existing tensions and increase the risk of miscalculation or escalation in a volatile region.
4. Impact on U.S.-Israel Relationship: While not directly related to Israel’s capabilities, Egypt’s turn towards China for advanced weaponry could indirectly affect the dynamics of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
   • U.S. Concerns: The U.S. might express concern over Egypt’s reliance on Chinese systems, potentially leading to discussions about maintaining Israel’s QME through other means, such as providing even more advanced U.S. technology to Israel.
   • Potential for Friction: If the U.S. imposes sanctions on Egypt under CAATSA for purchasing Chinese arms, it could create friction in the U.S.-Egypt relationship, potentially impacting the U.S.-Israel dynamic as well, given Israel’s close ties with both nations.
5. Shifting Regional Power Dynamics: A stronger Egyptian Air Force, equipped with advanced Chinese technology, could alter the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East.
   • Increased Egyptian Influence: A more capable EAF could allow Egypt to project its power more effectively in the region, potentially influencing conflicts or negotiations.
   • New Strategic Considerations: Israel would need to carefully consider these new dynamics in its strategic planning and regional security calculations.

In Short: A Strategic Rebalancing Act

Egypt’s potential acquisition of Chinese J-10C and J-35 fighters represents a calculated strategic rebalancing act. Driven by a desire for greater strategic autonomy, frustration with Western restrictions, and the need to acquire cutting-edge capabilities to address evolving regional threats, Cairo appears to be embracing China as a key partner in its military modernization.

While the full scope and official confirmation of these deals are yet to emerge, the implications are clear: a more technologically advanced Egyptian Air Force, a strengthened Chinese presence in a critical geopolitical region, and a test of the long-standing security relationships between the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies. This move underscores the ongoing shifts in global power dynamics and the increasing multi-polarity of the international arms market.